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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN CASUAL.TY COMPANY OF
READING PENNSYLVANIA, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
8664
MARDEN D. PEARSON, EDWARD A. CROFTS,
and DWAIN J. PEARSON, d/b/a PEARSON
and CROFTS, and ROBERT CORPORON,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for the County of Salt Lake,
Honorable Ray VanCott, Judge.
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN and
L. E. MIDGLEY,
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgmeEt holding
that the Respondent, American Casualty Company, ~s not
liable under their contract of insurance for loss to an automobile damaged by fire in the garage of the assured, Pearson
and Crofts, a partnership, three of the Appellants.
The Record will be referred to hereinafter as "R." and
the Deposition of Robert Corporon as "D.".
On October 4, 1955, the Defendant Corporon purchased
a Cadillac automobile from the co-defendant partnership,
Pearson and Crofts (D. 3). The sale to Corporon was complete and the purchase price fully paid on October 4, 1955,
(D. 10).
Corporon took delivery of the car at that time and drove
it until he returned on October 8, 1955, for installation of a
trailer hitch (D. 10, 11 and 5) when work was commenced
but further postponed until October 10, 1955, (D. 5).
Corporon desired a specific result involving a peculiar
manner for ?astenfng th;-hitCh (R. 11 and 12). When
he came for completion of the work on October 10, 1955,
Corporon himself drove his car into and all the time it was
in the garage, even though it became necessary to move the
vehicle to another part of the shop (R. 11, 12, and 14). No
employee of 'Pearson
and Crofts, at any time, drove or~
-·=·-..:.--- -physical contact with the car (R. 12).
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Corporon not only supervised the remodeling and design of the trailer hitch itself after it had been taken from
the old vehicle (R. 13), but also supervised, directed and
managed the installation on the· new car (R. 13, D. 6 and 7).
4
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A fire occurred while the trailer hitch was being welded
doing extensive damage to the car (D. 8).
Corporon commenced an action against Pearson and Crofts
to recover the damage to the automobile, whereupon demand
was made by both Pearson and Crofts and Corporon upon
the Plaintiff, American Casualty Insurance Company, for a
settlement of the claim under their contract of insurance
with Pearson and Crofts styled "Comprehensive Liability
Policy", attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A".
The Plaintiff insurance company thereupon filed an
action agiDnst botfi-~Corpoionari-d Pearson and. Crofts for a
declaratory judgmenf -claiming that 'Pl~iintiff'S- policy, ex:eluding coverage for injury to property in the "care, custody
or control of the ins~re~did n~t cove;the -fire. inciden[
-

'

·~-~_,.

___ ..........:....... ~-

--

-
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The trial court ruled that the vehicle was in the care,
custody, and control of the insured, ·Pearson and Crofts, and
therefore the Plaintiff had no liabil~ty on its insurance
policy and this appeal is taken from that decision.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
'POINT I
THE TRIAL COUR.T ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE AUTOMOBILE WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT PE·ARSON AND CR·OFTS.
POINT II
THE GARAGE MUST HAVE DOMINION OVER THE
VEHICLE IN ORDER TO HAVE CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL.
5
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE AUTOMOBILE WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTOPY,
AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT; PEARSON AND CROFTS.
Corporon never transferred to Pearson and Crofts care,
custody, or control of the automobile.
The cases are uniform in holding both that the mere
working on property does not establish care, control, or
custody in the repairman or garage keepe:r;, (Boswell vs.
The Travelers 36 NJ Sup. Ct. 599, 120 A2d 250. Haerens vs.
Commercial Casualty 279 P2d 211, 120 CA2d, Supp. 892),
2nd that the fact that property is within a building owned
and controlled by one does not give him care or custody of
property within it (Cohen and Powell vs. Great American
Indemnity Company, 127 Conn. 257, 16 A2d 354, 131 ALR
~102, H,.2nraban Xfl State 57 Ind., 527).

.... ~4-·

~

The Plaintiff can 'show no more than that the Defendants Pearson and Crofts own the building where, and one
of their workmen was employed in working on the vehicle
when, the loss occurred.
We submit, therefore, that if either care, custody, or
control attaches here, then there are no conceivable situations which would expose the insurer to any risk under their
garagekeeper's liability clause. The insurer would be excused where an explosion occurred in a service station if
the station employee was filling the car with gas, replacing
H fan belt, or filling the tires. No liability would attach if
an oil plug were not replaced, a tire were over-pressured, or
6
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~.

fan belt. faultily replaced, all causing subsequent damage
due to the negligence of the attendant, for the reason that
his master had assumed care, custody or control when he
conferred any service upon the vehicle.

M· Morris and Com;Qany vs. Lymbe.rmans Mutt:ta1298
NYS 227, holds that" 'control' and 'care' indicate possession
€xclusive of that of anyone else." In this case the owner of
the vehicle continued complete dominion and control of his
car at all times to the exclusion of Pearson and Crofts.
Examining the meaning of each of the w.ords in the
phrase which, as said in the Boswell case (Supra), are inherently ambiguous wor.ds of art and should be construed
against the insurer who wrote the contract, we see the
following:
Care: Care implies safekeeping, preservation, or security. Words and Phrases Vol 6, p. 140 et. seq. Certainly the
vehicle here was in no sense "entrusted" to Pearson and
Crofts for safekeeping, preservation or security.
~

-

.___....--:-,.,.

Control: To exercise a directing, restraining, or governing influence. W~rd_s_ a,nq Phrases Vol.-~·'-£~~ Certainly
the complete supervision, dominion, control, and surveillance
exercised by Corporon vitiates the possibility of a transfer
of 'control' to the Defendant Pearson and Crofts.
Custody : Custody means a keeping, guarding, care,
watch, preservation or security of a thing within the immediate personal care .of the pey.~on to l~\g;se custody it is
subjected. Turner vs Coffin, ·73 Pac. !S~, 9. Idaho.· 338.
Brierman-Danzie Corp. vs. Fire~ens Fund-Insll"r~~~~c<;"~p:
any (115 NYS 2d 706) holds that "custody implies temporary physical control and assumption of responsibility for the
7
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property". Webster's Unabridged Dictionary states that
custody derives from the latin "custos", meaning a guard
or watchman.
Where the facts are, as here, that the owner of an
automibile drives it into a garage, drives it on to a hoist,
provides the garagekeeper with a prefabricated, peculiarly
designed device for attachment thereto, instructs the garagekeeper as to all installation, remains with his property
at all times, superintends all the work which is done at his
direction and under his supervision and instruction, and
when the vehicle is moved always with the owner at the
wheel, there is never any relinquishment by the owner, or
transfer to the garagekeeper, of any of the incidents of
care, control, or custody.
POINT II
THE GARAGE MUST HAVE DOMINION OVER THE
VEHICLE IN ORDER TO HAVE CARE, CUSTODY,
OR CONTROL.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "dominion" as follows:
"Ownership, or right to property. Title to an article of
property which arises from the power of disposition and
the right of claiming it."
In Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automotive Law and
Practice, Section 4154, Pg 413, the text states: "Under an
E-xception appearing in such policies (g·arage), as to property
owned by the insured or property of others in his custody,
the insurer is not liable for injury to property in which
the insured ..... has either a general or a special interest."
It is respectfully submitted that in the ordinary situation where an owner of a vehicle takes his car to a baaraae
~
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for any type of repair, the moment the garage starts work
upon the vehicle the garage automatically secures a Mechanic's Lien upon the vehicle. This lien can, and often does,
develop into an ownership right, including the right of
disposing of the vehicle and certainly the right of claiming
ownership to the extent of selling the vehicle.
In the case at Bar, the garage had previously been paid
in full for the installation of the trailer hitch on the vehicle
(D. 4 and 10). The owner, Corporon, at any time during
the progress of repairs, had the right to order the garage
to stop work and to leave with the vehicle, the garage having
uo rights whatsoever in retaining possession of the car or
holding it. The garage had no "general or special interest"
whatsoever in the vehicle under the circumstances of the
case at Bar.
In the leading cas·e of State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company vs. Connable J oest, Inc., 174 Tenn. 377, 125
SW 2d ~' the Court states:
V:/

" ... It is clear that the policy, which is one
of indemnity, afforded coverage to the insured in
the event of damage to the property of others, not
rented, leased by, or in charge of the insured."
" . . . the interest of the parties . . . was to
exclude the insurance company from liability for
claims £or damage to property under the control
and management of the insured, whether by virtue
of ownership, lease, rental, or having charge of the
property under any other authority, or in any other
capacity."
In Sky vs. Keystone (Pa) 29A 2d 230, the Court pointed
out that the words "in charge of" does not mean mere
possession. The Court states: "Property is not in charge of
the insured unless he has the right to exercise dominion
or control over it."
9
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In Cohen and Powell vs. Great American Indemnity
Company, 16A 2d 354 (Conn.) the Court states, at Pg 355:
"A person or thing is not in cha:rge of an insured within the meaning of the pohcy unless he
has the right to exercise d~minion o! controi over
it. This element is present 1n every Illustration of
the use of the phrase which comes to mind, for
example, a nurse in charge of a c~ild, a warden in
charge of a prison, a caretaker 1n charge of an
estate".
In Welborn vs. Ill. National Casualty Company, 106
NE2nd 142 (Ill.) the Court states:
"The exclusion pertains to (the insured's) own
personal loss from damage to his own property".
"It is perfectly logical to treat a car which
the insured had rented from another as though it
were his own for purposes of exclusion. Likewise, if
he borrowed a car from a friend, and was temporarily 'in charge of' such car, the same reasoning
should apply."
"Thus we treat the e~clusion . . . as though
the terms in the exclusion have a related significance, so that they apply to property owned by the
insured, or which have a status which is logically
treated the same as ownership for the purposes of
the policy".
In Vaughan vs. Home Indemnity Co. (Ga.) 71 SE 2d
111, the Court states:
"The plaintiff had custody of and control and
dominion over the automobile at the time ... so as
to render him 'in charge of' it and so as to bring
it under exclusion."
The fact that dominion over the vehicle is required in
order for the exclusion under the policy to become effective
i~ more readily apparent when we look at the very purpose
of the exclusion.
10
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We submit that the reason for the exclusion is to prevent an insured, garage keeper, from making claims against
his own insurance company, repayment of which would
fjnancially benefit the garage keeper. In other words, the
insurance companies, quite properly, did not intend to entertain claims wherein, in effect, the insured was making claim
against himself.
In Appleman Automobile Liability Insurance, at Page
200, the text quotes the purpose of exclusion as follows:
"Property owned by the insured and damaged
by him personally could never form a proper basis
of a claim as he could not, of course, be plaintiff
and defendant in the same action .
. . . There is entirely too much danger of the
human element 'entering into the proper settlement
of losses which, except for this exclusion, would
otherwise be covered. The natural desire to escape
payment of a loss personally would lead the policyholder to establish a certain situation, not in fact
existent, or to exaggerate or color the facts in order
to have the loss covered."
We point out that in the usual situation where the garage has incurred a substantial bill during the course of
repairs of a customer's automobile, and then, through their
own negligence, damaged the vehicle, the garage, without
the exclusion, could encourage a claim against the insur2nce company, the payment of which would, of course, result in the payment of the garage's bill for services for the
repairs prior to the garage's own negligence which resulted
in the loss.
CONCLUSION
There was no dominion over the Corporon vehicle at
the time of this loss and there was, therefore, no care,

11
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custody, and control under the meaning of the policy, and
the defendants, Pearson and Crofts, are entitled to protection under the insurance policy.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN and
L. E. MIDGLEY,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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